Suchergebnisse

"June 18, 1957." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc. ; "Appendix III, text of Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 .": pt. 1, p. 575-580. ; Comprises previously unpublished hearings held in 1949-1950 by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (named 1975-1979 Committee on International Relations). ; CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 76 H461-84 ; pt. 1. Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.--pt. 2. Extension of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Testimony of Gen. Dwight Eisenhower on the Mutual defense assistance program. Assistance to Greece and Turkey. Latin American military assistance. ; Microfiche. ; Mode of access: Internet.

At head of title: Foreign affairs outlines. ; Caption title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"Throughout the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union strategized to prop up friendly dictatorships abroad. Today, it is commonly assumed that the two superpowers' military aid enabled the survival of allied autocrats, from Taiwan's Chiang Kai-shek to Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam. In Up in Arms, political scientist Adam E. Casey rebuts the received wisdom: Cold War-era aid to autocracies often backfired. Casey draws on extensive original data to show that, despite billions poured into friendly regimes, US-backed dictators lasted no longer in power than those without outside help. In fact, American aid regularly destabilized autocratic regimes. The United States encouraged the establishment of strong, independent armies like its own, which then often incubated coups. By contrast, Soviet aid incentivized the subordination of the army to the ruling regime, neutralizing the threat of military takeover. Ultimately, Casey concludes, it is subservient militaries-not outside aid-that help autocrats maintain power. In an era of renewed great power competition, Up in Arms offers invaluable insights into the unforeseen consequences of overseas meddling, revealing how military aid can help pull down dictators as often as it props them up"--

On November 1, 1953 the Karachi correspondent of the New York Times filed a dispatch reporting that discussions of a military alliance between Pakistan and the United States were about to begin. On February 25,1954 President Eisenhower announced that the United States had decided to give military assistance to Pakistan for the purpose of "strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Middle East." With the President's statement a new and powerful force entered the international politics of South Asia and another landmark of American foreign policy was set up. In the four months which intervened between the newspaper report and the official announcement, most of the important trends and issues in contemporary world politics had touched on or been touched by the U. S.-Pakistan proposal. Internal and external affairs of a dozen countries were affected. Most of the instruments of diplomacy and propaganda were employed to support or oppose agreement. Of primary importance to the United States was the clear and specific implementation of our established policy of supporting regional alliances of free nations to "contain" Soviet aggression and to prevent further expansion. Because of the novelty of the area into which the policy was extended, the speed with which it was implemented, and the precision of the reactions of all parties, American military assistance for Pakistan constitutes an almost ideal case study of international relations in a world in which the movement of events has been greatly accelerated.